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Introduction
Sociologists of religion often measure religiosity along 
three dimensions, known informally as the three B’s—
belonging to or identifying with a religious group; reli-
gious behavior such as membership in a congregation 
and attendance in religious services; and belief in God. 
Edgell (2012: 258) asserts that “religion’s influence on 
an individual’s attitudes, beliefs, and actions may … vary 
across time or social location.” This paper concentrates on 
the American context in the early 21st Century. Its con-
tributions are fivefold: First, to segment the U.S. popula-
tion into eight groups based on their yes or no answers 
on each of the three dimensions of religion by creating 
a 2x2x2 matrix of belonging/behavior/belief. Second, 
to place those eight groups along a spectrum to create a 
single unified scale of religiosity. Third, to examine shifts 
over time in the ways the population is divided into the 
eight groups. Fourth, to identify socio-demographic fac-
tors that are associated with a person’s position on the 
spectrum. Fifth, to test the power of this new measure by 
examining its ability to predict how people answer ques-
tions on contentious societal issues, using belief in evolu-
tion as a case study.
The main data sets utilized in the paper, the American 
Religious Identification Survey series, do not track the 
same individuals over time but rather look at increases 
and decreases in the size of population groups. The large 
national data sets are the best currently available to create 
a unified religiosity scale based on the three B’s and to test 
its application. This paper focuses on the experiences of 
individuals rather than congregations or denominations. 
Its contribution is primarily empirical.
Background and Hypotheses
Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Religiosity 
Patterns of religiosity in America have been extensively 
researched. Some empirical studies have found stable lev-
els of religiosity (Presser and Chaves, 2007), while others 
have found changes over time (Putnam, 2000; Schwadel, 
2013). The different conclusions can be attributed in part 
to the sources of data used and in part to which aspect 
of religiosity the authors focus on: belonging, behavior, 
or belief. 
To some scholars who focus on behavior, moderniza-
tion, consumerism and economic constraints explain the 
decline in religious practice, as non-religious activities com-
pete for limited and precious time (Robinson and Godbey, 
1999; Gruber and Hungerman 2008). Disillusionment 
with religious institutions and their leaders, and erosion 
of confidence and trust in these institutions, may also 
distance people from religious community. The General 
Social Survey (GSS) showed a decline in public trust in all 
institutions (besides the military) since 1976. Organized 
religion did not fare well. Gallup (2013) showed that while 
43% of Americans in 1973 expressed a “great deal” of con-
fidence in “the church or organized religion,” by 2012 only 
25% did. Other scholars argue that the rise of the Nones 
has been counterbalanced by a corresponding rise in the 
super-religious—in other words, they see an increase in 
polarization (Finke and Stark, 2005; Hout et al., 2001; 
Stark, 1999; Stark and Finke, 2000; Wuthnow, 1988). Yet 
others, faced with evidence of declines in belonging and 
behavior, have asserted that religiosity overall has not 
declined, because belief remains intact. Hout and Fischer 
(2002), for example, examined three possible explana-
tions for the rise of the Nones (those who report no reli-
gious affiliation, regardless of their belief or behavior). 
Their three explanations are secularization, demograph-
ics, and politics. They reject the secularization explanation 
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mainly because the majority of American Nones believe 
in God and an afterlife. They argue that the demographic 
explanation cannot wholly explain the rise of the Nones 
because demographic processes are too slow to account 
for the sudden change in religiosity. They conclude that 
politics was the primary factor. The growing detachment 
from organized religion in their view is associated with a 
backlash against the political powers of the religious right. 
Proponents of the privatization hypothesis assert that 
even if fewer Americans report a religious affiliation, 
they continue to believe in God and have a spiritual life 
(Berger, 1967; Bibby, 1987; Luckmann, 1967; Swatos and 
Christiano, 2000). Chaves (2011) argues, for example, 
that “There is more to religious involvement than partici-
pation in organized religion.” Likewise, Idler (2001) says 
that private engagement in prayer and meditation is more 
prevalent than public attendance in religious services. 
Davie (1994) described the pattern in Britain as “Believing 
without belonging.” But this is not the only possible 
pattern. Day (2011) titled her recent book Believing in 
Belonging. Based on data from Europe and North America, 
she describes how people choose religious identification 
to complement other social and emotional experiences 
of ‘belongings.’ Using GSS data, Sherkat (2011) describes 
a pattern of belonging without believing. Sherkat argues 
that in the United States, unlike in other countries, there 
are more people who belong to religious groups who do 
not believe in God than there are people who believe but 
do not belong to religious groups. 
Measuring the Three Dimensions of Religiosity
Discourse on the first B, belonging to or identifying with 
a religious group, has become contentious, specifically 
with regard to the rise of American Nones. This rise is a 
new phenomenon. As recently as 2000 Swatos and Chris-
tiano (2000: 8) suggested, “Virtually no empirical research 
supports the prediction of a societal slide from a peak of 
sacrality into a valley of secularity.” Since then there has 
been a substantial increase in the percentage of Ameri-
cans who report no religious affiliation (i.e., Nones; see 
Hout and Fischer, 2002; Kosmin et al., 2009; Putnam & 
Campbell, 2010; Pew, 2012). Pew Research reports that the 
number of unaffiliated totaled 36 million adults in 2007 
and grew to 47 million in 2012 (Pew 2012). 
The second B, behavior, is measured by whether or not 
one chooses to devote time and financial resources to 
membership in a religious congregation. (This contrasts 
with the first B, belonging, which is strictly a measure 
of self-identification.) The public is almost evenly split 
between members and non-members of religious insti-
tutions. Some people join a congregation because it ties 
them to a religious community, which also provides social 
connections and support (Wuthnow, 1999). However, 
this involves commitment on the part of the individual 
or the family. Generally, participation in religious activi-
ties requires both economic and social commitments, 
payment of donations or fees, and conformance to the 
policy, schedule and set of rules of the congregation and 
its leaders. Given the voluntary nature of active religious 
participation and membership, only half of the popula-
tion opts in. 
To minimize risk of social desirability bias inherent in 
self-report data collection (Hadway, et al., 1993; Presser 
and Stinson, 1998), Presser and Chaves (2007) looked 
at the Bureau of Labor Statistics American Time Use 
Survey (ATUS). The ATUS records daily activities of a ran-
dom sample of Americans 15 years and older. By ask-
ing respondents to report all types of activities, hour by 
hour, ATUS tracks Americans’ religious behaviors without 
directly asking them questions that might lead them to 
exaggerate. The estimates for Sunday attendance based 
on ATUS data1 for “religious and spiritual activities” range 
between 26% and 28% from 2003–2007 (Presser and 
Chaves, ibid.).
There is contradictory evidence on stability versus 
change in religious behavior. Presser and Chaves (2007) 
found stable weekly attendance of about 40% of the adult 
population at religious services from 1990 to 2006 based 
on General Social Surveys and American National Election 
Studies. The GSS asks, “How often do you attend religious 
services?” But the General Social Survey data from 1972–
2008 showed an increase in the percentages of Americans 
who never attend religious services from about 13% in the 
early 1990s to 22% in 2008 (Chaves, 2011). That decline 
points to a shift toward less religious activity in the past 
two decades, corroborating our findings.
On the third B, belief in God, most surveys have failed to 
capture the complexity and nuance of Americans’ belief. 
This is not—or should not—be a simple yes-or-no ques-
tion. The conventional wisdom that the United States is 
overwhelmingly a nation of believers (Wuthnow, 1988; 
Kosmin and Lachman, 1993; Lipset, 1996; Newport, 2012), 
while correct, obscures more than it reveals. The empiri-
cal evidence created by the basic question asked in the 
Gallup Polls since 1944, “Do you believe in God?” shows 
that well over 90% of Americans answer “yes”—affirming 
their belief in God. However, the percentage answering 
“no” rose from 1% in 1967 to 7% in 2011 (Gallup, 2011). 
As I will show, the sharp rise in “no” answers is just one 
indicator of a widespread degradation of religious belief 
in America. 
This standard question on belief in God unintention-
ally overestimated the intensity of belief (Bishop 1999), 
as it masked what people actually think regarding the 
existence of God. In fact, levels drop drastically when 
Americans are asked more specific belief questions. For 
instance, when asked how certain they are about their 
belief in God, only 72% said “absolutely certain” in 1996. 
Furthermore, refined responses help distinguish between 
types of beliefs about God. As illustrated by an exam-
ple from a GSS belief question asked in 1993, 1994 and 
1998, a person who chose “I don’t believe in God” could 
be classified as an atheist; “I don’t know whether there is 
God, and I don’t believe there is any way to find out” as 
an agnostic; “I don’t believe in a personal God, but I do 
believe in a higher power of some kind” as a deist; “I know 
that God exists and I have no doubts about it” as a the-
ist and a firm believer (only 63% in 1998). There are two 
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additional optional responses in the GSS of less committed 
believers: “While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in 
God” and “I find myself believing in God some of the time, 
but not at others.” (For full comparisons between levels of 
beliefs generated by different types of survey questions, 
see Bishop, 1999). Differences in questions asked over the 
years make it difficult to determine whether belief in God 
has diminished over time. Wuthnow (1988), citing the 
Gallup polls, asserted that most Americans claim some 
belief in God; however, fewer Americans than in the past 
are certain about their belief. Those who are absolutely 
sure God exists dropped from 66% of adults in 2003 to 
54% in 2013 in Harris Poll surveys (2013). 
Belief in the divine is the most common way American 
people express their religiosity. As pointed out by Bishop 
(1999), question wording regarding belief affects how 
respondents understand and respond. Agreeing that “God 
exists,” one might argue, is effortless (Beit-Hallahmi and 
Argyle, 1997). In fact, by following the majority, people 
dissociate themselves from the outcast atheists. In the U.S., 
after all, atheists are the most distrusted religious group 
(Edgell, et al., 2006). In a recent public opinion poll four 
out of ten Americans (43%) said that they would not vote 
for a presidential candidate who is an atheist,2 compared 
with 5% who would not vote for a Catholic candidate, 6% 
for a Jewish candidate, 18% for a Mormon candidate, and 
40% for a Muslim candidate (Gallup, 2012). 
Belief in the divine is the most persistent of the three 
B’s. It is the stronghold of religiosity. But this strong-
hold rarely stands alone. Anthropologist T.M. Luhrmann 
(2012) argues that belief is socially situated: It follows 
from rather than causes religious belonging and behavior. 
If this is so, then it should be expected that people will 
lose belief after ceasing belonging and behavior, and con-
versely gaining belief after affiliating with a religion and 
joining a congregation. 
The next step is to build a religious-secular continuum 
that combines the three B’s into a single scale. This allows 
us to extract meaning and draw conclusions that aren’t 
obvious from regarding each of the three B’s separately. 
Movement in one direction along the continuum repre-
sents secularization, while movement in the other rep-
resents deepening of religiosity. This approach is not 
without controversy. Pearce et al. (2013) argue against 
measuring religiosity along a continuum from low to 
high. The authors chose to create five latent classes based 
on 12 indicators of religiosity in their study of American 
adolescents, naming the classes abiders, adapters, assent-
ers, avoiders, and atheists. However, this approach has its 
own difficulties. Aside from the least religious and most 
religious groups—“atheists” and “abiders”—the classes are 
hard to distinguish from one another. They overlap signifi-
cantly in beliefs, experiences and practices.
Despite intense interest and debate, the lack of an 
agreed-upon metric of secularization before now has com-
plicated social scientists’ ability to reach consensus on the 
extent of the phenomenon. Fortunately, relevant data are 
available in the American Religious Identification Surveys 
(ARIS) of 2001 and 2008 and the General Social Surveys 
(GSS) of 1988, 2000, and 2010. It is impossible to track 
the religious journeys of individuals in surveys that collect 
only aggregate data. What is possible is to see the process 
of secularization unfold through the decline and growth 
of different population clusters, from the fully religious by 
the three measures of religiosity to the fully secular. 
This leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis I
I hypothesize that for society as a whole, the first of 
the three B’s to decline is religious behavior. It is fol-
lowed by a decrease in religious identification, and 
only then by a decline in belief in the divine. There-
fore the transformation from the most religious to 
the least religious pattern on the religious-secular 
spectrum will generate certain combinations of the 
three B’s that are more common than others. For 
example, the cell of the matrix representing people 
who lack belief but display religious behavior and 
belonging is predicted to be quite small.
What variables explain movements along the religious-sec-
ular spectrum? Demographic traits and religious upbring-
ing help explain religious and non-religious behaviors 
and attitudes. One of the most notable features of the 
rising Nones is their demographic profile—young, male, 
and highly educated (Kosmin and Keysar, 2006; Baker 
and Smith, 2009). The Pew survey (2012) found that 32% 
of young Americans have no religious affiliation, while 
according to ARIS 2008 29% of Americans 18–29 years 
old professed no religion (Kosmin, and Keysar, 2009). Reli-
gious leaders have long observed the demographic gap in 
their pews. Many young people find organized religion 
irrelevant and outdated (Religious News Service, 2012). 
For psychologists youth is associated with rebellion and 
rejection of organized religion (Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle, 
1997; Keysar, 2007). Older Americans are more likely to be 
sure of God’s existence (Keysar, 2007).
Gender is another important demographic attribute 
associated with religious and secularity gaps. Intensity of 
religiosity and worldviews is gendered. Persistently dif-
ferent patterns for men and women have been observed 
in Western societies (Baker and Smith, 2009). Women 
are well known to be more religiously active than men 
(Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle, 1997). In Western European 
and Scandinavian societies, men were found more likely 
to be non-believers in an afterlife who ‘never pray’ 
(Furseth, 2010). 
Women tend to seek comfort and emotional support in 
religion, while men express a greater tendency to disbe-
lieve and reject authority (e.g. Beit-Hallahmi, forthcom-
ing). Socialization is one factor. Many women are raised 
to be mothers and to take care of their families (Douglas, 
1977), and be nurturing and submissive, qualities that are 
associated with greater levels of religiousness (Thompson, 
1991). Voas and Crockett (2005: 24) studied religious pat-
terns in Britain and asserted that “daughters are generally 
influenced by their mothers – and there are signs in the 
data that maternal influence on religiosity is stronger for 
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female than for male teenagers – the gender gap may be 
partly self-perpetuating.” 
Miller and Stark (2002) challenged the religious sociali-
zation theory, which holds that the different societal roles 
assigned to men and women help explain the differences 
in their religiosity. In a cross-cultural and cross-religion 
exploration they offered risk-taking as an alternative 
approach, claiming that non-belief and irreligious behav-
ior involve risk-taking. “Failure to conform in terms of 
beliefs and practices, or the commission of ‘sins,’ can 
result in serious consequences, such as going to hell” (ibid. 
1404). Men are known to be risk-takers in other domains, 
such as drinking, drug use, smoking and adultery, as well 
as in financial decision-making. These risky behaviors may 
also apply to irreligious behavior. According to Miller and 
Hoffman (1995) reluctant risk-takers were more religious, 
effects that held within each gender. Why are women less 
likely to be risk-takers? Miller and Hoffman (1995) attrib-
uted gender gaps in risk taking to differential socialization, 
as boys are encouraged to be courageous and aggressive 
while girls are encouraged to be passive and gentle. Miller 
and Stark (2002) concluded that differences in risk-taking 
probably have a biological rather than sociological expla-
nation. Comparing the United States and Japan using 
World Values Survey data (1995), they showed that on 
measures of religious affiliation, practice and belief in the 
supernatural, gender differences were by far smaller and 
less significant for the Japanese than Americans, explain-
ing the narrower gender difference by the lower risk of 
being irreligious in Japan. 
Economists of religion also challenge the importance of 
religious socialization, arguing that while it applies to tra-
ditional societies it is less relevant in modern industrialized 
economies. Economists of religion apply a human capital 
framework (Iannaccone, 1990). They say that in socie-
ties with a traditional familial division of labor, religion 
is regarded as a household commodity, which belongs to 
the female sphere. As women make strides in higher edu-
cation and increase their participation in the labor force, 
economic realities overwhelm traditional religious sociali-
zation. As women take upon themselves tasks that were 
previously assigned to men, traditional religious practices 
are also challenged, and women’s religious involvement 
and worldviews may change as well. In pursuit of empow-
erment, some women join new religious movements and 
alternative spiritual communities (Berger, 1998; Finley, 
1994); some try to feminize their religious community; 
others simply follow their male counterparts and reject 
organized religion (Furseth, 2010). 
Geography also plays a role. The geographic clustering of 
American non-identifiers, non-members and non-believers 
in the West fits its classification as the “none zone” in the 
Religion by Region series (Killen and Silk, 2004). 
This leads to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis II
I hypothesize that one’s place on the 2x2x2 matrix of 
belonging/behavior/belief will differ systematically 
by demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, 
geography, and religion. Specifically, I expect men 
and young Americans to be more secular, and those 
who reside in the South to be more religious.
The third hypothesis examines the connection between 
religiosity and public opinion. The American public is 
divided on societal issues, which often develop into politi-
cal rifts. Fiorina and Abrams (2008: 584) described the 
polarization of the American public along lines of religios-
ity as well as political membership, asserting, “A significant 
degree of sorting has occurred, however—most clearly 
between members of the two parties, but also along lines 
of religion and possibly geographic location.”
Some of the debates are over legalizing same-sex mar-
riages and abortions. Other discourses challenge the sci-
entific community over stem cell research and school 
curriculum, mainly science education. These debates, 
often characterized as culture wars, reflect people’s religi-
osity and secularity (Keysar and Kosmin, 2008; Kosmin, 
2013). For methodological reasons and availability of data, 
this paper focuses on attitudes relating to science, which 
are at the heart of societal debates on public policy issues. 
One important issue in the culture wars is evolution. 
The American public is deeply divided over accepting or 
rejecting human evolution3 (Miller and Pennock, 2008). 
This division directly influences battles over science edu-
cation and contributes to the emergence of ideologi-
cal politics (Mooney, 2005; Pennock, 2005). A great deal 
has been written on Americans’ attitudes toward scien-
tific issues, ranking the U.S. nearly last in acceptance of 
evolution (only Turkey ranks lower among 34 surveyed 
nations;4 see Miller, Scott and Okamoto, 2006). Evolution 
challenges fundamentalist Christians’ teachings about 
God’s powers and the belief that human beings are the 
direct creation of God (Pennock, 2007). The creationist 
movement’s battles over scientific curriculum, inflamed 
by religious motivations, are seen by some as “part of a 
broad assault on rationality and on secular institutions” 
(Blackburn, 2008: 45). Religious fundamentalist world-
views clash with science over the issue of human evolu-
tion; as Miller and Pennock (2008) explain, “The antipathy 
that so many Americans feel toward the idea of being 
related to animals is part of the reason that the religious 
right has used evolution as a political wedge issue” (17). 
These attitudes towards scientific issues are significantly 
related to Americans’ self-identification with a religious 
group. When asked in 2008, “Do you think that human 
beings, as we know them, developed from earlier species 
of animals?” 17% of Americans in general said they ‘defi-
nitely’ accept human evolution while 36% said ‘definitely 
not.’ However, Americans who profess no religion in 2008 
exhibited notably different worldviews: 33% ‘definitely’ 
accepted human evolution while 17% said ‘definitely not.’ 
(Kosmin, et al. 2009). Attitudes towards human evolution 
have never before been tested against the combinations 
of the three B’s. 
This leads to the third and fourth hypotheses:
Hypothesis III
I hypothesize that one’s position on the religious-sec-
ular spectrum is related to one’s attitudes towards 
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current social debates, specifically towards human 
evolution. Moreover, I hypothesize that Americans 
who reject the theory of human evolution will cluster 
in the religious end of the spectrum. 
Hypothesis IV
I hypothesize that the religious-secular scale is a use-
ful tool to assess people’s perceptions on ideological 
and educational issues. Specifically, I believe that 
the most religious and the most secular remain at 
opposite poles on attitudes towards human evolu-
tion even after demographic and religious variables 
are controlled for. 
Methods
This paper utilizes several sources of data. For the explora-
tory analysis and creation of the religious-secular scale, 
I utilize the American Religious Identification Surveys 
(ARIS). To validate the scale generated by the ARIS data, I 
supplement it by creating similar grids utilizing the Gen-
eral Social Surveys (GSS). For the multivariate regression 
analysis, I use the ARIS 2008 data.
I conduct both descriptive and multivariate statistical 
analyses. Four regression models test shifts along the reli-
gious-secular spectrum. Similar to hierarchical steps, in 
each model I add more variables. I start with socio-demo-
graphic factors, add geography, then religious indicators, 
and lastly worldviews as predictors for shifts along the 
religious-secular spectrum from the most religious point 
to the most secular point.
Data Sources
American Religious Identification Surveys (2001 & 2008)
The data are drawn from the findings of the American 
Religious Identification Survey series, in particular ARIS 
2001 and ARIS 2008. Both ARIS 2001 and ARIS 2008 are 
nationally representative random-digit-dialed telephone 
surveys, each with more than 50,000 adult respondents: 
ARIS 2001 with 50,281 and ARIS 2008 with 54,461. The 
data are based on self-reporting in response to an open-
ended question: What is your religion, if any? Religious 
self-identification is not based on whether established 
religious (or non-religious) bodies, institutions, churches, 
mosques, or synagogues consider them to be members. 
To the contrary, the surveys sought to determine whether 
the respondents regarded themselves as adherents of a 
religious community. The open-ended approach gener-
ated a significant number of responses or categories of 
religious groups, faiths, and denominations (Kosmin and 
Keysar, 2006). Similarly, other segments of the American 
population, those who self-identify as “atheist,” “secular,” 
or “humanist,” chose these options voluntarily. 
For a more detailed inquiry into religious beliefs, ARIS 
2001 incorporated a nationally representative sub-sam-
ple of 17,911 adults, collecting information on beliefs in 
God and membership in religious institutions, while ARIS 
2008 utilized a nationally representative sample, albeit 
smaller, of 1,015 adults who were asked more detailed 
questions on life cycle religious behaviors and beliefs in 
the divine. 
Two methodological adjustments were introduced in 
the data collection of ARIS 2008. In 2008 the traditional 
landline interviews were supplemented with a national 
cell phone survey to include the growing segment of the 
population who use cellular telephones exclusively. In 
addition, interviews were conducted both in English and 
Spanish. The use of cell phones interviews and inclusion 
of Spanish interviews increased the coverage and reduced 
the non-representation bias.
General Social Surveys (1988, 2000, 2010)
The General Social Survey (GSS) is an annual or bien-
nial probability sample of households conducted by the 
National Opinion Research Center (NORC) of the Univer-
sity of Chicago. Face-to-face interviews are conducted with 
one randomly selected adult in selected households. Since 
2006 interviews in Spanish have been added. The GSS is 
highly regarded due to its high response rates (between 
70–80%) and its wide range of demographic, behavioral 
and attitudinal questions, including special societal and 
political topics. Many of the core questions have remained 
unchanged since 1972, allowing investigators to conduct 
trend studies. Unlike the ARIS series, the GSS main ques-
tion on religion provides closed options to choose from: 
What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, 
Jewish, some other religion, or no religion? 
Measuring the 3 B’s—Descriptive Analysis
1. Belonging to, or Identifying with, a Religious Group
Belonging is measured by answers to the open-ended 
question: What is your religion, if any? For purposes of this 
article, survey respondents are categorized as “belong-
ing” if they self-identify with a religious group, whether 
or not they are official members or belong to a particular 
congregation or attend services. One important measure 
of secularity is professing no religion. People who profess 
no religion include those who replied “none,” “agnostic,” 
“atheist,” “secular” and “humanist” to the open-ended reli-
gious identification question. They numbered 14 million 
adults in 1990, 29 million in 2001 and over 34 million in 
2008 (ARIS 2008). 
In all, the responses aggregated as “No Religion” 
amounted to 8.2% of the American adult population in 
1990, 14.1% in 2001 and 15.0% in 2008. These findings 
were corroborated by the General Social Survey (GSS) in 
2004. The GSS asked: “What is your religious preference?” 
and 14.3% said “none.” A survey by Pew found that 16% of 
adult respondents said they were religiously unaffiliated 
in 2007 and just under 20% in 2012 (Pew, 2007, 2012). 
Of those people who reply “none” to a survey question 
on religious identification, only a fraction self-identifies 
as “agnostic” or “atheist.” Nevertheless, these small groups 
have almost doubled in number from 1.9 million in 2001 
to over 3.6 million adults or 1.6% in 2008. 
2. (Religious) Behavior
Another obvious social manifestation of being connected 
to religion is one’s behavior, and one way this can be indi-
cated is by membership in a religious congregation. The 
reasons for not being a member of a religious congrega-
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tion vary widely, from ideological attitudes to physical 
access issues. Although the population of those who are 
members of a religious congregation is very large, ARIS 
2001 found that at the beginning of the 21st century, 
46% of American adults, nearly 100 million people, did 
not regard themselves as or claim to be members of reli-
gious congregations.
It is hard to assess to what extent members of houses of 
worship are religiously active. Therefore, ARIS 2008 looked 
at participation in religious services and did not simply 
ask about congregational membership. Despite the limi-
tations, one can assume that those who attend religious 
services regularly are also members. In general, ARIS 2008 
showed that 55% of American adults said they attend once 
a month or more often, 20% of Americans said they never 
attend religious services and 23% said they attend only a 
few times a year. (As noted above, these numbers are sub-
ject to over-reporting.) The latter group could be intermar-
ried, leading the nonreligious partner to join his/her more 
religious family member occasionally at services. Putting 
these latter two groups together, 43% of Americans say 
they do not attend religious services regularly5. 
3. Belief in God
A new belief question was introduced in ARIS 2008 to 
better understand people’s perceptions regarding the 
existence of God. While 70% “definitely” believe in a per-
sonal God, an additional 12% believe that there is a higher 
power but no personal God. These two categories com-
bined (82% of respondents) are approximately the same 
as the single category from the 2001 survey, those who 
believe in the existence of God, which comprised 95% of 
respondents. The remaining categories from the 2008 sur-
vey are hard to describe as believers. They are “there is no 
such thing” (2%), “there is no way to know” (4%), “I’m not 
sure” (6%) and refused (6%).
The Complexity of the Three B's
The three dimensions of religiosity and secularity reveal 
the complexity of slicing the American religious/secular 
pie. Each dimension when looked at separately shows a 
different pattern revealing the asymmetric relationship of 
the religious/secular in each dimension:
•	 Belonging (Identification):
 ◦ In 2001 & 2008 there was an 80/20 split between 
identifiers and non-identifiers. 
•	 Behavior (Membership/Attendance):
 ◦ In 2001 & 2008 there was a 50/50 split between 
members and non-members in religious organiza-
tions. 
 ◦ In 2008 there was a 55/45 split between attenders 
and non-attenders in religious services.
•	 Belief in God:
 ◦ In 2001 there was a 95/5 split between believers 
and non-believers in the existence of God.
 ◦ In 2008 there was an 82/18 split between believ-
ers and non-believers in a personal God or higher 
power.
Creating a Scale: Belonging, Behaving and Believing 
2001 & 2008
To capture all three dimensions together, I created a scale 
which takes into account for each respondent whether s/
he 1) identifies with a religious group; 2) holds household 
membership in a religious institution (2001) or attends 
religious services regularly (2008); and 3) believes in God, 
i.e., agrees that “God exists” (2001) or believes in a per-
sonal God or higher power (2008). 
Table 1 and Figure 1 present the overall distribution 
of these eight (2x2x2) options for both 2001 and 2008. 
They show how the frequency of the eight combinations 
of belonging, behaving and believing have changed over 
time. Although some of the measurements were modi-
fied in the two surveys, they remain similar enough that 
changes can still be monitored. The challenge is to create 
a linear scale for the degree of religiosity using dichoto-
mous variables of qualities that are not directly compara-
ble. In the regression analysis (below), clusters are created 
based on the number of “yes” answers a respondent gave 
on the three B questions: 0, 1, 2, or 3. The ordering within 
each cluster was based on the level of religiosity of the dif-
ferent combinations as discussed below. 
Because this is not a longitudinal study, it is impossible 
to follow individuals over time to observe their movement 
between the eight groups. I can only infer individuals’ 
movements from changes in the relative sizes of the 
groups. I make the parsimonious assumption for this 
study that when people shift, it is to a neighboring cluster, 
such as from (yes, yes, yes) to (yes, no, yes). Support for this 
assumption is provided by a longitudinal study of young 
Conservative Jews from 1995 to 2003, which showed a 
large number of students ceasing to attend services while 
still belonging and believing, but few or none jumping 
from fully religious in one survey wave to fully secular in 
the next (Keysar and Kosmin 2004). Certainly there are 
some individuals who do so, but they are outliers. 
Results
1. Using ARIS Data
Two results emerge: Wide variation in degrees of religios-
ity, and a trend toward secularity at all points along the 
spectrum. There is a decrease in the share of Americans in 
the most religious groups and a corresponding increase in 
the least religious groups. The most religious group shrank 
slightly from 54.5% to 53% but still constitutes the larg-
est sub-group of the adult population. It represents adults 
who report identifying with a religion, holding religious 
membership or attending services regularly, and believing 
in God (the most religious category – (yes, yes, yes)). 
More noticeably at the other end of the scale, there is 
a doubling of the most secular combination: people who 
do not identify with a religious group, do not belong to 
a congregation or never attend religious services (or go 
just a few times a year), and are atheists or agnostics with 
regard to a personal God (no, no, no). 
Changes also occur in the middle points of the scale 
where the three dimensions are not the same (in other 
words, not all ‘yes’ or all ‘no’). On the secular side of the 
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Figure 1: Changes in Belonging, Behavior, and Belief. Source: ARIS 2001 and ARIS 2008
Legend: See Table 1
Identification Membership/Attendance Belief in God Share of Population 
2001
Share of Population 
2008
No No No 2.8% 6.0%**
No No Yes 8.2% 9.5%**
Yes No No 1.0% 4.1%**
No Yes No 0.5% <1%
Yes Yes No 0.7% 1.1%*
No Yes Yes 2.2% <1%**
Yes No Yes 30.0% 24.7%**
Yes Yes Yes 54.5% 53%**
Table 1: Religious Identification, Membership/Attendance and Belief U.S. Adult Population, 2001 and 2008 (weighted). 
Sources: American Religious Identification Survey, 2001 n = 17,911; American Religious Identification Survey, 2008 
n = 1,015
** < .01; * < .05
Legend (excluding ‘don’t know’ and ‘refuse’ in both surveys)
2001
Identification: Yes = Identifies with a religion; No = ‘None,’ ‘Atheist,’ ‘Agnostic’ ‘Secular,’ ‘Humanist’
Membership: Yes/No Is anyone in your HH currently a member of a church, temple, or mosque?
Belief that God Exists: Yes = Agree strongly/Agree somewhat; No = Disagree somewhat/Disagree strongly
2008
Identification: Yes = Identifies with a religion; No = ‘None,’ ‘Atheist,’ ‘Agnostic’ ‘Secular,’ ‘Humanist’
Attendance: Yes = Attend more than once a week/ Once a week/ Once or twice a month; No = A few times a year/Never
Belief in God: Yes = There is definitely a personal God/ There is a higher power but no personal God; No = There is no 
such thing/There is no way to know/ I am not sure
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spectrum are those who belong yet do not believe or 
behave religiously (yes, no, no). Although this is a small 
minority, it is four times its share of the American popula-
tion compared with 2001. 
On the religious side of the spectrum there is a signifi-
cant decrease (from 30% to 25%) in those who belong, do 
not participate regularly in religious services, yet believe 
in a personal God (yes, no, yes). However, this remains the 
second biggest group of Americans, outnumbered only by 
the most religious group (yes, yes, yes). Although I am not 
tracking the same people over time, ceasing regular par-
ticipation in religious services remains a common choice 
for Americans, presumably when they leave the (yes, yes, 
yes) group. The fact that this group’s share of the popula-
tion shrank from 2001 to 2008 suggests that some people 
who were once in the (yes, no, yes) group have taken a fur-
ther step away from religiosity, to (no, no, yes) or (yes, no, 
no). Those two groups together grew by 4.4 percentage 
points from 2001 to 2008—coincidentally, about the same 
as the decrease in the (yes, no, yes). Clearly the transition 
from a religious to a more secular society is not a dras-
tic change from one extreme (yes, yes, yes) to the other 
extreme (no, no, no). 
Further evidence for the importance of membership 
and attendance as a bulwark of religiosity is that people 
who do attend services are highly unlikely to drop either 
of the other two B’s. It is rare to find a person who attends 
but does not believe (yes, yes, no)=1%, or who attends but 
does not have a religious identification (no, yes, yes)<1%, 
or who attends but does not believe or have a religious 
identification (no, yes, no)<1%. 
Beyond a shift towards more secularity, Figure 1 illus-
trates the particularity of American religion and non-
religion. There are persisting combinations, while other 
combinations along the religious-secular spectrum do 
not survive. Most notably, the pattern of believing with-
out belonging (no, no, yes), constituting one in every 
ten Americans, is more common than belonging with-
out believing (yes, no, no), supporting the claim that 
belief is the last bastion of American religion. This latter 
group, although small (only 4%), seems to have gained 
adherents at the beginning of the 21st Century. These are 
people who are probably attached to a religious group 
nominally. They do not attend religious services regularly 
nor do they express belief in a personal God. Affiliation 
with a religious group might reflect family loyalty and 
nostalgic sentiments toward their religious upbringing 
(Beit-Hallahmi, 1997). 
It is quite revealing to document which religious-sec-
ular combinations are rare or even endangered, namely, 
attending religious services without belonging to a reli-
gious group or believing in God (no, yes, no). Some people 
might feel lost in houses of worship without an attach-
ment to a specific religious group or strong belief in 
the divine. Likewise, the share of Americans who do not 
belong yet behave or believe is shrinking (less than 1%). In 
other words, I could hardly find any Americans who attend 
religious services regularly and believe in a personal God 
yet do not identify with a religious group (no, yes, yes), 
or non-believers who identify with a religious group and 
participate at services regularly (yes, yes, no), perhaps 
because the latter as non-believers feel uncomfortable in 
religious congregations and communities. 
2. Corroboration from GSS
NORC’s General Social Survey allows us to create a similar 
religious-secular grid of identification/attendance/belief 
for 1988, 2000 and 2010, when the same questions were 
administered by the GSS. 
GSS data corroborate the ARIS trend data by showing 
how the two polarities, the religious and secular, change 
over time. As the share of the most secular segment 
goes up, the share of the religious part is going down. 
Furthermore, the earlier starting point for the GSS allows 
for a longer time span than ARIS. The results show a 
greater drop in the share of the most religious segment of 
American society (yes, yes, yes) from 63% in 1988 to 54% 
in 2010, and an increase in the most secular segment of 
American society (no, no, no) from 2% in 1988 to 7% in 
2010. The share of believers who neither identify with a 
religious group nor attend religious services (no, no, yes) 
increases from 5% in 1988 to 10% in 2010, according to 
GSS (See Figure 2). 
Beyond portraying similar trends, the GSS and ARIS data 
establish remarkably similar estimates on both ends and 
the middle of the religious-secular spectrum. 
Looking at several cohorts in the GSS, Sherkat (2011) 
also finds a growing segment of Americans who nei-
ther believe nor belong to religious organizations. ARIS 
revealed the initial dimension – participation in religious 
services – decreased when society experienced shifts in 
religiosity. Both ARIS and GSS data provide support for 
hypothesis I by showing that most of the change on the 
religious-secular grid to date has been in religious behav-
ior, with a smaller decrease in religious identification, and 
only small changes in belief. However, aggregate data 
cannot fully establish the validity of this hypothesis. That 
will require a longitudinal study showing the sequence of 
movements of individuals between the different cells of 
the 2x2x2 matrix.
ARIS and GSS data show that the most prevalent secu-
lar Americans are people who do not identify or behave 
religiously but do believe in God (no, no, yes) and those 
who totally distance themselves from all three dimensions 
of religion (no, no, no). But another group has gained in 
numbers: identifiers who do not participate in religious 
services and do not believe in the divine (yes, no, no). 
There is also a group that has almost disappeared: (no, 
yes, yes). These are people who do not identify with a reli-




In 2001 men dominate (72%) the small group of non-iden-
tifiers who are involved with a religious institution and 
don’t believe in God (no, yes, no). Indeed, the top three 
most male groups (at least 2/3 male) are non-believers. 
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The fourth group from the top, again a small one, con-
sists of those who don’t identify with a religious group, yet 
are members of religious institutions and believe in God. 
Females, on the other hand, dominate only two groups, 
the two most religious combinations, which are the larg-
est groupings, representing almost 80% of the adult pop-
ulation. In both of these combinations people believe in 
God and self-identify with a religious group (See Figure 3). 
The relatively small sample in 2008 precludes a similar 
detailed presentation of the eight-point scale by gender. 
Even so, similar patterns persist. Most striking, both in 
2001 and in 2008 men are twice as likely as women to be 
in the most secular group, (no, no, no), and also among 
the believers who do not belong and do not attend ser-
vices, (no, no, yes). 
About 10% of men in 2008 are found at the extreme 
(no, no, no) category. An additional 10% follow the 
(no, no, yes) pattern. That means that one in every five 
males is in these two secular groupings. Similarly, 47% 
of males versus 58% of females are found in the most 
religious category (yes, yes, yes). Moreover, the (yes, no, 
yes) grouping, the group of non-attenders, which plum-
meted in 2008, decreased mainly among men, from 30% 
in 2001 to 22% 2008 (and from 32% to 26% respectively 
among women). 
B. Age
Two groupings stand out because of their large number of 
young people. More than half of the (no, yes, yes) category 
consists of young adults under age 35, and 47% of the (no, 
no, yes) category is under age 35. As expected, young peo-
ple are found in the three non-believer groups: (no, no, no), 
(no, yes, no), and (yes, no, no). In each about 42% of group 
members are adults under age 35. In 2008, young people 
are over-represented among non-identifying adults, who 
don’t attend services regularly, yet believe in a personal 
God (no, no, yes), and among those who belong, but do 
not behave or believe (yes, no, no). Two groups stand out 
Figure 2: 'Corroboration from GSS: Changes in Identification, Attendance, and Belief. Source: GSS
Legend
Identification: Yes = all religions; No = no religion 
Behavior: How Often Attend Religious Services?
Yes = Attend several times a year/once a month/2–3 times a month/nearly every week/ every week or more; No = Never 
attend religious services/ less than once a year/ once a year
Belief: Respondent’ Confidence in the Existence of God? 
Yes = Some higher power/ believe sometimes/ believe but doubts/ know God exists; No = Do not believe/ no way to 
find out
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in 2008, the believers who do not belong or behave reli-
giously, the (no, no, yes) and the most religious one, (yes, 
yes, yes). While the first group is relatively young, the last 
one, the most populous, is far older.
C. Geography
The two polarities of the religious-secular spectrum are 
concentrated in different geographic regions. While the 
growing, yet small, secular polarity (no, no, no) is most 
likely to be found in the West (about 40%), the somewhat 
dwindling religious polarity (yes, yes, yes) is most likely to 
be found in the South (again about 40%). Similarly, the 
other religious segment (yes, no, yes) is most likely to be 
found in the South.
D. Upbringing and Life Cycle Behavior
Among people who had a religious initiation, such as a 
baptism, christening, circumcision, confirmation, bar 
mitzvah or naming ceremony, indicating some religious 
upbringing, 60% believe, behave and belong (yes, yes, 
yes) as adults, compared with only 42% of those who did 
not have a religious initiation. Those who did not have an 
initiation are by far more likely to be in the most secular 
grouping (no, no, no): 13% compared with 5% of those 
who had an initiation ceremony. Although these results 
are highly significant they are correlations and do not 
indicate a causal relationship. 
I hypothesized (II) that the type of dimension (belong-
ing/behavior/belief) one loses might be different 
systematically by demographic characteristics and geog-
raphy. That was supported. Americans who reside in the 
South are more religious in all three dimensions. The evi-
dential gender gaps clearly support hypothesis II whereby 
more men are clustered in the secular parts of the reli-
gious-secular grid. 
E. Attitudes toward Human Evolution
The most non-religious (no, no, no) people overwhelm-
ingly accept human evolution. In contrast, people at the 
other extreme (yes, yes, yes) overwhelmingly reject it. 
In between, believers, the (no, no, yes), are split almost 
evenly in their opinions on human evolution, while 
identifiers, the (yes, no, no) people, tilt toward accepting 
human evolution. But the pattern reverses toward rejec-
tion of human evolution among the (yes, no, yes) group-
ing. In other words, believers who identify with a religious 
group but do not participate in religious services regularly 
tend to adopt a religious view toward human evolution. 
When I combined three small groups, (no, yes, no), (no, 
yes, yes) and (yes, yes, no), into one group—an ambivalent 
group—there is a strong linear relationship between the 
support of human evolution and the religious-secular 
scale. The more secular a person the more likely s/he finds 
human evolution to be “definitely true.” Simultaneously, 
flat denial of human evolution peaks at 78% among the 
most religious group and drops sharply to 9% among the 
most secular group. Figure 4 shows that the “somewhat 
secular” (no, no, yes), believers who neither identify nor 
Figure 3: Religious Identification, Membership and Belief Scale by Gender in 2001. Source: ARIS 2001
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actively engage with religion, are at the crossover point: 
roughly equal numbers of them describe human evolu-
tion as “definitely false” and “definitely true.” 
Figure 5 shows a gap between the two poles on the reli-
gious-secular scale. The most secular group overwhelm-
ingly believes in human evolution (78% said “definitely 
yes”) while a great majority of the most religious group 
flatly rejects it (78% said “definitely no”). 
The religious-secular grid is highly correlated with 
people’s attitudes towards a highly debated social issue, 
here measured by attitudes towards human evolution. 
This scale effectively exhibits the two polarities of the 
American public—the most religious versus the most secu-
lar—illustrating how they are harbingers of extremely dif-
ferent worldviews.
Multivariate Models
The multivariate methods aim to explore religiosity and 
irreligiosity and also test hypothesis IV. The goal of the 
analysis is to test how the various clusters of the three 
B’s are created and explore changes in religious intensity. 
One way is to monitor the number of positive answers 
respondents gave on the three B questions on a scale from 
the most secular position with no positive answer, namely 
category 0=no, no, no to 1 positive answer, “yes,” to 2 “yes” 
and finally, the most religious position with all positive 
answers: 3=yes, yes, yes. I predicted that if people lose the 
first two dimensions they will soon lose the third and be 
regarded as nonreligious. The models segment the popu-
lation based on socio-demographics, region and religion 
in order to predict the likelihood of progressing along the 
spectrum of belonging, behaving and believing. 
There is, however, one feature of the American reli-
gious landscape that needs to be taken into considera-
tion. The belongers, behavers and believers (yes, yes, yes) 
constitute half of the American population, arguably 
not an extreme group, but rather a majority. In order 
to improve the explanatory power of the multivariate 
models, I sliced the American pie further by splitting this 
large religious group, and creating a 9-point scale (rather 
than an 8-point scale). The asterisk after the word yes sig-
nifies greater religious intensity. In the “extremely reli-
gious” (yes, yes*, yes*) group are Americans who identify 
with a religion, attend religious services weekly or a few 
times a week, and “definitely” believe in a personal God. 
They are about 40% of the adult population. Looking 
at their socio-demographics, they are overwhelmingly 
older and more likely to be female. The share of the 
‘extremely religious’ is far more prevalent in the South 
than in other geographic regions, the Northeast or in the 
West and Midwest.
Table 2 presents hierarchical regression models for the 
9-point religious-secular scale, whereby 1=(no, no, no), i.e. 
the most secular group of non-identifiers, non-behavers 
and non-believers and at the other extreme, 9=(yes, yes*, 
yes*), i.e. the most religious group of identifiers, weekly 
attenders who definitely believe in a personal God. To 
repeat, in the religious-secular scale, the first item repre-
sents identification with a religion, the second represents 
attendance at services, and the third represents belief in a 
Figure 4: Attitudes toward Human Evolution and the Belonging, Behavior, and Belief Scale 2008. Acceptance of Evolu-
tion by Religiosity: Most and Least Accepting. Source: ARIS 2008
Keysar: Shifts Along the American Religious-Secular SpectrumArt. 1, page 12 of 16 
personal God. The 9-point scale is defined: 1=(no, no, no); 
2=(no, no, yes); 3=(yes, no, no); 4=(no, yes, no); 5=(yes, 
yes, no); 6=(no, yes, yes); 7=(yes, no, yes); 8=(yes, yes, yes), 
9=(yes, yes*, yes*).
I chose the most religious Americans as the base cat-
egories: females, living in the South, who had a religious 
initiation, plan a religious funeral, and do not believe in 
human evolution. I introduced the various variables in 
stages, in all utilizing four models, to predict shifts along 
the spectrum from the most secular to the most reli-
gious. The first model introduces demographic predic-
tors, the second adds geography, the third adds life-cycle 
Figure 5: Probability of Accepting or Rejecting Evolution: The Most Religious versus the Least Religious 2008. Source: 
ARIS 2008
Table 2: Hierarchical Regression (OLS) of Belonging, Behaving, and Believing 9-Point Scale 2008
*** < .001; ** < .01; * < .05
Note: Standardized regression coefficients are shown. The baseline are adult females, living in the South, who had a 
religious initiation, such as baptism, who expect to have religious funeral services, and do not believe in human evo-
lution. Age is a continuous variable.
Dependent Variable BBB Scale 1 = no, no, no… 8 = yes, yes, yes 9 = yes, yes* yes*
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Demographic 
Gender -.137*** -.138*** -.073* -.052
Age  .103**  .103**  .082**  .041
Geography
Region -.135*** -.093** -.063*
Life Cycle Religious Behavior
Initiation -.115*** -.129***
Religious Funeral -.465*** -.364***
Religious Attitudes
Human Evolution -.340***
Adjusted R2 .031 .048 .291 .385
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religious behavior, and the last adds attitudes towards 
human evolution.
Model 1 shows that the demographic factors, gender 
and age, are significant predictors of the 9-point religious-
secular scale. Being male significantly reduces the likeli-
hood of being placed higher on the religious spectrum 
(negative coefficient) while being older is positively asso-
ciated with greater religiosity. Model 2 indicates a signifi-
cant effect of region, whereby those who live outside the 
South are less likely (negative coefficient) to religiously 
belong, behave and believe in 2008. 
Model 3 adds religious initiation and end of life ritual, 
which elevate substantially the power of the analysis 
(Adjusted R2 increases sharply to 0.291). Model 4 increases 
the explanatory power even further (Adjusted R2 =0.385) 
by adding an attitudinal variable of a contentious topic, 
people’s perceptions towards human evolution. Those 
who believe in human evolution are the most secular 
along with those who do not expect to have a religious 
funeral, supporting hypothesis IV. Interestingly, gender is 
only marginally significant at the 0.06 level, and age is not 
statistically significant in this model. It raises the possibil-
ity of an interaction between age and religious attitudes. 
I tested the interaction between religiosity and world-
views within each age group to assess whether the effects 
of attitudes toward human evolution on the religious-
secular spectrum operate differently for younger or older 
Americans. Examining the interaction of age and attitude 
towards human evolution shows that people’s attitudes 
are statistically more important in determining their 
placement on the religious-secular scale than their age 
is. To illustrate: between 14% (those under 35) and 19% 
(those over 35) of believers in human evolution are in the 
most secular category (“no” on belonging, “no” on behav-
ior, and “no” on belief) compared with only 1% of those 
who do not believe in human evolution regardless of 
age. In contrast, between 17% (those under 35) and 19% 
(those over 35) of deniers of human evolution are in the 
extremely religious group of identifiers, which includes 
weekly attenders who definitely believe in a personal God, 
compared with 2% - 5% of believers in human evolution. 
Limitations
Four limitations should be considered when interpreting 
the findings presented. First, the wording of questions 
about behaving and belief changed slightly from 2001 
to 2008. (There was no change in question wording for 
belonging.) While this limitation must be acknowledged, 
it is highly unlikely to have affected trend estimates. In 
2001, the behavior question asked whether anyone in 
the respondent’s household was currently a member of 
a church, temple, or mosque. In 2008, the question was 
how frequently the respondent attended religious ser-
vices. The respondent was categorized as a “yes” for behav-
ior if he or she attended more than a few times a year. That 
is similar to answering, “yes” in 2001 to being a member of 
a religious institution. As for belief, in 2001 people were 
asked if they agree (strongly or somewhat) that God exists. 
In 2008, the question was more detailed. A “yes” on belief 
was given to people who answered that there is definitely 
a personal God or who said there is a higher power but no 
personal God. Regrouping categories helped us minimize 
the effects of different question wordings. 
A second drawback is the relatively small sample in 
2008 compared with 2001. Nevertheless, ARIS 2008 is 
a representative national sample of the American adult 
population. A third issue concerns limited availability of 
data critical to understanding social divisions and culture 
wars. The only available data was on attitudes towards 
human evolution. Clearly a battery of questions on highly 
contested issues that the American public grapples with, 
such as abortion, climate change, gun control, immigra-
tion, and same-sex marriage, would help determine the 
correlation between religiosity and worldviews. To com-
pensate for the limitations of the ARIS data, GSS findings 
were also included. The corroboration from the GSS vali-
dates the ARIS findings by showing similar patterns and 
trends. Also, the GSS questions were identical in each 
of the three years, strengthening the significance of the 
observed trend.
Fourth and finally, neither the ARIS series nor GSS were 
designed as longitudinal studies and they do not track 
the same individuals over time. To capture the dynamic 
and characteristics of shifts along the religious-secular 
spectrum researchers would have to follow people over 
their life course—from adolescence to young adulthood 
and further as they develop romantic partnerships, get 
married and become parents. These life events involve 
decision-making on religious behavior and participation. 
Following the same individuals over time would also shed 
light on the role of socio-demographic factors and help 
predict future trends. A longitudinal design could shed 
light on the sequence of transitions from a religious to 
secular society. which trigger people to alter their reli-
gious behavior, identification and belief.
Discussion 
The ‘de-Christianization’ of American society, namely the 
sharp decline of those identifying with Christian denomi-
nations from 86% of the population in 1990 to 76% in 
2008 (ARIS 2001 & ARIS 2008) and to 73% in 2012 (Pew 
2012), was not offset by a rise in new religious movements 
(as predicted by Stark, 2000; Barker, 1989) but rather 
by a rejection of all organized religions and the marked 
increase in the ‘none’ population to 16%-20% of the adult 
population. Of course, this still leaves a great majority 
of people retaining a religious identity, though many of 
them don’t belong to a religious institution or participate 
in religious services. 
The notable rise of the Nones, people who profess no 
religion, began in the 1990s (Kosmin and Keysar, 2006; 
Putnam and Campbell, 2010; Chaves, 2011) but remained 
under the radar for a long time. Even the ARIS 2001, which 
showed the growth of Nones from 8% in 1990 to 14% in 
2001, was met with skepticism. In a USA Today article in 
March 2002, for example, American sociologist of religion 
Rodney Stark said, “People aren’t really saying, ‘I have no 
religion.’ …they are just unchurched.” It took a few years 
until corroborating results – 14% of Nones found by GSS 
2004; 15% by Pew (2007); and more recently 20% (Pew 
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2012) – stirred the public and religious leaders to grapple 
with the secularization trend (Religious New Service, 2012). 
This paper demonstrates that the growing secular seg-
ment of the American population is becoming heteroge-
neous. On the eight-point religious-secular spectrum, the 
last two groups on the grid (yes, yes, yes & yes, no, yes) are 
classified as ‘religious America’ and the six other groups, 
22% of the population, as ‘secular America.’ Obviously 
these latter 55 million adults are not all similar to each 
other. They include men and women, young and old, poor 
and rich. They live in the East, West, North and South. 
For religious America there is more stability among the 
(yes, yes, yes) than among the (yes, no, yes). The latter seg-
ment seems to lose adherents. Furthermore, all combina-
tions indicating ‘yes’ to attendance in services are losing 
adherents. It is possible that the path from a religious to 
a secular mode is first manifested by a drop in religious 
service attendance. Durkheim made this point a century 
ago. In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1915:44) 
he wrote that “the idea of religion is inseparable from the 
idea of a Church” and “religion must be an eminently col-
lective thing.” The “Church” is far weaker than it was in 
Durkheim’s time. Rather than participation in religious 
activities following from belief, it may be more com-
mon that belief follows from religious activities. As more 
Americans turn away from religious services, I expect reli-
gious uncertainties and disbelief will grow.
The most secular segment on the grid, the (no, no, no) 
group, has doubled in the first decade of the 21st Century. 
Some deliberately depart from the majority and from 
the traditional American norms, while others drift into 
this minority status. Their youth and high educational 
level hint at possible further growth and their potential 
influence on the general population beyond their rela-
tive minority. In this project I showed that the secular 
extreme is growing at the same time as the religious 
extreme is declining. 
Norris and Inglehart (2004: 18) asserted that,
The United States remains an outlier among 
postindustrial societies, having a public that holds 
much more traditional worldviews than that of any 
other developed country except Ireland. But even 
in America, there has been a lesser but percepti-
ble trend toward secularization; the trend has been 
partly masked by massive immigration of people 
with relatively traditional worldviews…but when 
one controls for these factors, even within the U.S. 
there has been a significant movement toward 
secularization.
The findings presented here support the conclusion on 
contemporary trends of American religion by Chaves 
(2011: 110): “no indicator of traditional religious belief or 
practice is going up. There is much continuity and some 
decline.” And, “If there is a trend, it is toward less religion.” 
The current paper demonstrates the growth of the 
most secular, and the decline in the religious segments 
and groups in the middle. The process is complex but for 
the most part consistent. Remarkably, the surveys show 
a wide-ranging migration in the population from (yes, 
yes, yes) toward (no, no, no). This paper has explained the 
“what.” Further research is required to establish the “why.”
The religious-secular scale also demonstrates that the 
most religious and the most secular are at opposite poles 
on at least one critical ideological and educational issue, 
evolution. As illustrated in Figure 5, their opinions regard-
ing human evolution pull them in opposite directions – 
the most religious definitely reject human evolution while 
the most secular definitely believe in human evolution 
– and create sharp social divisions. This 8-point scale is 
not the final word. It may apply to some religious groups 
better than others. Still, by providing a simple metric of 
religiosity and secularity, it could become a useful tool for 
social scientists. Further research should be conducted to 
determine whether the scale is useful in predicting atti-
tudes toward other controversial matters.
Since the religious majority is only slowly eroding and 
it is the young who are most likely to be in the growing 
secular minority, it is likely that culture wars over polariz-
ing issues, like reproductive rights and human evolution, 
will be with us for a long time to come. 
Notes
 1 For details on ATUS methodology, see http://www.bls.
gov/tus/atusfaqs.htm#1.
 2 This reflects a somewhat growing acceptance of athe-
ists as earlier opinion polls showed that 53% of Ameri-
cans would not vote for an atheist as president (Pew 
Research Center, 2003).
 3 Respondents were asked if the statement: “Human 
beings, as we know them, developed from earlier spe-
cies of animals,” is true or false or if they were not sure.
 4 European countries, Japan and the U.S. 
 5 About 2% refused or were not sure
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